We show that the Mayers-Shor-Preskill approach and Renner's approach to the security proof of quantum key distribution (QKD) are essentially the same. We begin our analysis by considering a special case of QKD called privacy amplification (PA). PA itself is an important building block of cryptography, both classical and quantum. The standard theoretical tool used for its security proof is called the leftover hashing lemma (LHL). We present a direct connection between the LHL and the coding theorem of a certain quantum error correction code. Then we apply this result to prove the equivalence between the two approaches to the security proof of QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique for distributing information-theoretically secure keys between two remote parties connected by a quantum channel [1, 2] . Today QKD is a real-world technology; tests have carried out in various realistic situations, including metropolitan fiber networks [3] and satellite communication [4] ; there are also commercially available products [5] . Behind such great news, there is always the security proof. No QKD system cannot be secure unless a rigorous security proof is given.
At the present, there are two major approaches for obtaining security proofs:
• Phase error correction (PEC)-based approach:
This is usually called the Shor-Preskill approach, or sometimes the Mayers-Shor-Preskill approach [6, 7] . One constructs a virtual QKD protocol which has a quantum phase error correction (PEC) algorithm embedded inside. The security analysis is then reduced to upper bounding the failure probability of the quantum PEC, e.g., by using a coding theorem. This approach was initiated by Mayers [6] , and later simplified and improved by many others including Shor and Preskill [7] , Koashi [8, 9] , and Hayashi [10] .
• Leftover hashing lemma (LHL)-based approach: This is usually called Renner's approach [11] . Once a lower bound on the (smooth) minimum entropy of a sifted key is estimated, one can guarantee the secrecy of the corresponding final key, simply by applying an existing formula called the leftover hashing lemma (LHL, or lemma 1 of this paper).
To the best of our knowledge, these two methods have generally been considered independent of each other. This is perhaps because mathematical relations between them were not fully investigated. It now seems customary to publish two papers that prove the security of the same QKD protocol by using each of the two approaches: E.g., to name a few, for the asymptotic case of BennettBrassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1] there are papers of the PEC-based approach [6, 7] and of the LHL-based [11] ; for the finite-size case there are refs. [10] and [12] ; for the Bennett 1992 (B92) protocol [13] there are refs. [14] and [11] . Empirically, however, obtained results are the same for most problems of practical interest (e.g., the final key rate for a given value of the security parameter ε), regardless of the approach.
The goal of this paper is to show that these two approaches are in fact essentially the same. We demonstrate this fact by presenting a direct connection between these two approaches. That is, for QKD protocols in general, we present an explicit procedure for converting a security proof of one approach to that of another approach. We also show that the two approaches achieve the same level of security; i.e., they give the same security bound except for the presence of an inessential constant factor. Thus hereafter, there is no need to publish two security proofs for the same QKD protocol; one is enough.
We begin our analysis by considering privacy amplification (PA) algorithms [15] . PA can be thought of as a special case of QKD where the sender Alice alone generates a secret key in the absence of the receiver Bob. At the same time, PA itself is an important building block of cryptography, both classical and quantum (see, e.g., [15] [16] [17] ). The LHL mentioned above is the standard theoretical tool used for guaranteeing its security [11, 15, 16] . For this algorithm, we show that (i) there exists a direct connection between a PA algorithm and a certain quantum phase error correction (PEC) algorithm, and (ii) the LHL follows from a coding theorem of the quantum PEC algorithm.
Then we generalize these results on PA to QKD, and show that the same connection exists also for QKD protocols in general. That is, for QKD protocols in general, we present an explicit procedure for converting a security proof of the LHL-based approach to that of a PEC-based approach, and vice versa. We also show that the obtained security bounds are the same, except for the presence of an inessential constant factor.
II. REVIEW OF PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
Privacy amplification (PA) [15] is a technique for extracting a completely private bit string, from a given bit string which may be partially leaked outside. This can also be viewed as a special case of QKD where Alice alone generates a final key in the absence of Bob. In this section we review the definition and the security of PA.
A. Definition
Initial state and algorithm
PA starts with a classical-quantum (cq) state
where bit string a ∈ {0, 1} n is owned by the legitimate user (say, Alice), and states ρ ini,a E by the eavesdropper Eve. Note that Eve may be able to obtain a certain amount of information of string a by measuring ρ ini,a E , unless ρ ini,a E are all equal. PA is a technique to extract from string a a random string k which Eve cannot guess. More precisely, Alice selects a random function g, and then calculates a shorter string k = g(a). The idea is to realize the situation where Eve's state corresponding to k (ρ fin,g,k of eq. (4) below) are averaged, and less distinguishable than ρ ini,a E in the initial state.
Actual PA scheme (Π ap , ρ ini-ap )
Initial state: A sub-normalized cq state ρ ini-ap AE . Algorithm Π ap AKG : 1. Choice of hash function: Choose a random function g and announce it publicly by writing it in a Hilbert space H G .
2. Actual PA using hash function g (Π ap,g ): (a) Measure space H A in the Z-basis to determine the value of a.
(b) Calculate hash value k = g(a), and store it in H K .
-We denote the final state by ρ fin-ap (=ρ fin-ap AEKG = Π ap (ρ ini-ap )).
Terminology
We call a set of an algorithm and an initial state a scheme.
Whenever we say a function g is random, (i) there are a predetermined set of functions G = { g } (also called function family G) as well as a predetermined probability p G (g), and (ii) in an actual algorithm or protocol, a legitimate player, Alice or Bob, selects g with probability p G (g). In what follows, we often regard such g as a random variable and denote it by capital G; in this case the probability is written as p G (g) = Pr(G = g). All random functions considered in this paper have the output shorter than the input, and for this reason we often call them random hash functions, and their output a hash value.
Assumptions
Whenever we discuss a PA scheme, we impose the following assumptions. As to Hilbert spaces, H A and H K are under Alice's control, and H E is under Eve's. H G is a public space under both Alice's and Eve's control. As to random hash functions, we assume:
• Functional forms of g and probability Pr(G = g) are public.
• Functions g are of the form g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m with n ≥ m, and are linear and surjective.
Note that, from the first item, it is clear that the randomness and the secrecy of k are from those of the original string a, not of g. We remark that the surjectivity of g in the second item is solely for the sake of simplicity, and all the results of this paper in fact hold without it.
B. Standard security criterion of PA (ε-secrecy)
In this and the next subsections, we abbreviate ρ ini-ap , ρ fin-ap as ρ ini , ρ fin . In the security analysis, we may focus on system H KEG , because we are concerned with how much information of final key k is accessible from Eve through her degrees of freedom H EG , and nothing else. By construction of Π ap , it is obvious that the reduced state for H KEG corresponding to the final state ρ fin , i.e., ρ fin KEG = Tr A (ρ fin KAEG ), generally takes the form
Note that ρ fin,g can be interpreted either as the final state conditioned on Alice's choice g of a hash function (as in eq. (2)), or as the result of applying operation Π pa,g (i.e., 2 with g fixed) to the initial state;
It is customary to measure the security of ρ fin KEG by comparing it with the ideal state. To this end, we define the ideal state ρ ideal KEG corresponding to ρ fin KEG to be
This state indeed describes the ideal situation where Eve's states corresponding to k, i.e., ρ ideal,k E = 2 −m ρ E , are all equal, and thus all values of k are equally probable to her.
We measure the security of k against Eve by the trace distance · · · 1 between these actual and ideal states, which we denote by
A PA scheme is said to satisfy the ε-secrecy if the final state satisfies
This security criterion is known to satisfy the universal composability, and for this reason, considered as the standard.
We note that d 1 (ρ fin KEG ) can also be written as an average with respect to Alice's choice of g
This form will be convenient in subsequent sections.
C. Existing result on the security (quantum leftover hashing lemma)
Of various previous results on the security of PA, we focus in this paper on Renner's approach [11] using the quantum leftover hashing lemma (LHL, or lemma 1 below). The virtue of Renner's approach is its simplicity; once one obtains a lower bound of the minimum entropy H ε min (ρ ini AE |E) of the initial state ρ ini AE , the rest of the argument is finished almost automatically, by substituting it to the LHL. We briefly review this result below.
The minimum entropy H min (ρ AE |E) of a subnormalized state ρ AE is defined to be the maximum real number λ, satisfying
for a normalized state σ E [11, 18] . Further, the smooth minimum entropy H ε min (ρ AE |E) of a sub-normalized state ρ AE is the maximum value of H min (ρ AE |E) of subnormalized statesρ AE that are ε-close to ρ AE (ρ AE ≈ ε ρ AE ) [18] ;
(for details of ε-closeness, see appendix A or ref. [18] ). A random hash function G is called universal 2 or twouniversal [19] , if the collision probability of outputs of any distinct input pair a, a ′ (a = a ′ ) is bounded as 
and in terms of the smooth minimum entropy,
A proof of lemma 1 is given in chapter 5 of Renner's Ph.D. thesis [11] . In that thesis, Renner first bounds the 1-norm, d 1 defined in (10) , by the corresponding 2-norm d 2 . Then he averages d 2 with respect to G and suppresses unwanted terms by exploiting the universal 2 property of hash function G, so that it is bounded by the right hand side of (14) .
III. LEFTOVER HASHING LEMMA AS A CODING THEOREM OF QUANTUM PHASE ERROR CORRECTION
In this section, we prove essentially the same result as the LHL, by using a method different from the original paper. In other words, we prove inequalities which are identical to (14) and (15) except for an inessential constant factor, without relying on the results of ref [11] . In what follows, we will often call our version of inequalities (14) and (15) the LHL-like bounds.
The proof proceeds in two steps: (i) we present a direct connection between the actual PA algorithm Π ap and a certain quantum phase error correction (PEC) algorithm, and (ii) we obtain the LHL-like bounds as a consequence of the coding theorem of the PEC. More precisely, in step (i), we show that, without loss of security (i.e., without affecting the value of d 1 (ρ fin KEG )), we can modify the actual PA algorithm Π ap to another algorithm Π vp , which has a PEC algorithm embedded inside. Then in step (ii), we show that the security criterion, d 1 (ρ fin KEG ), can be bounded from above by the failure probability of the PEC algorithm. As a result of this, the LHL-like bound is obtained as a corollary of a coding theorem of the PEC.
This section can be regarded as a special case of our discussion on quantum key distribution (QKD), given in the next section. Recall that PA can be interpreted as a special case of QKD where Alice alone generates a final key in the absence of Bob. Then the argument below can be viewed as converting the LHL-based security proof of PA (i.e., the LHL itself) to the PEC-based security proof.
A. Notation
From now on, we assume that bras and kets indexed by a bit string are all eigenstates of the Pauli operator Z; e.g., for z ∈ {0, 1} n , Z z ′ |z = (−1) z ′ ·z |z . We also denote Fourier transforms of these Z-eigenstates by adding a tilde:
Note that these are eigenstates the Pauli operator X; i.e., X
We will often call |z the bit basis, and | x the phase basis, following the convention of quantum information theory. For more details of notation, see appendix A.
B. Conversion to a virtual PA scheme
As we have seen in the previous section, the only goal of the security proof of PA is to upper bound d 1 (ρ . The advantage of considering such virtual schemes is that, with an appropriate of choice of (Π ′ , ρ ′ ), one can simplify the mathematical proposition that needs to be proved. Also, as a result of that, one can even simplify the proof itself. We stress that virtual schemes are used only as a theoretical tool that is useful in this sense, and one never needs to care how to realize them in practice.
Below we construct an example of virtual schemes by modifying the actual scheme (Π ap , ρ ini-ap ) in three steps. Note that indeed none of these changes affects the corresponding final state ρ fin KEG in H KEG .
Preparing a purification
The initial cq state ρ ini-ap AE may be replaced with its purification |Ψ ini-ap AEA ′ , with H A ′ being an ancilla space under Alice's control.
PA as the bit basis measurements
Since hash function g ∈ G is linear and surjective (see the third paragraph of section II A), the i-th bit of k can be represented k i = g i · a with a set of linearly independent vectors g 1 , . . . , g m ∈ {0, 1} n . Hence step 2 of Π ap A is equivalent to measuring eigenvalues (−1) ki of operators
i.e.,Z i |a = Z gi |a = (−1) gi·a |a = (−1) ki |a . We will often call this step the bit basis measurement.
Quantum error correcting code P C
g defined from hash function g Define a classical error correcting code C g to be C g := (ker g) ⊥ , i.e., a linear code having generating matrix g = (g
T . By definition, h is an (n − m) × n matrix satisfying hg T = 0. Then from this classical code, C g , define a quantum error correcting code P C g by embedding in phase degrees of freedom of H A ; i.e., P C g is a quantum code characterized by a code space spanned by a basis { | x | x ∈ C g }, and syndrome operators
Note thatZ i andX j commute with each other due to hg T = 0. We note that P C g is the Hadamardtransform of a classical code having codewords in the bit basis { |x | x ∈ C g }; thus P C g corrects only phase errors, not bit errors. For this reason, we will often call P C g a phase error correcting code. We also note that P C g can alternatively be defined as a Calderbank-ShorSteane (CSS) code corresponding to a classical code pair (C 1 , C 2 ) = ({0, 1} n , ker g), in the notation of ref. [2] . In this terminology,Z i andX j are the logical Z operators and the stabilizers of the CSS code, respectively.
SinceZ i andX j commute, syndrome measurements withX j may be inserted before bit basis measurements withZ i . Also for the same reason, we may also insert arbitrary measurements in H A ′ , and phase flip operation using Z i , after the syndrome measurement and before the bit basis measurement.
Virtual PA scheme
By applying these three changes to the actual PA scheme (Π ap , ρ ini-ap ), we obtain virtual PA scheme
1. Choice of hash function:
Choose g ∈ G with probability Pr(G = g) and announce it publicly by writing it in Eve's space H G .
2. Virtual PA using phase error correcting
Determine phase error e ∈ {0, 1} n by measuring ancilla space H A ′ with an operator set M
iii. 
-We denote the final state by ρ fin-vp .
The following property is evident from the construction.
and thus the scheme above, (Π vp , |Ψ ini-ap ), is indeed virtual.
Recall that the security proof of PA is to show Note that the use of random hash function g in the actual scheme has now been translated to phase error correction Π pec,g using random code P C g (followed by the Z-basis measurement in step 2(b)). We will see below that the security of the PA scheme
) is also translated to the performance of the random error correction Π pec,g . Before going on, we give a technical remark. The phase error correction algorithm Π pec,g is in fact generalized from those typically found in textbooks, such as ref. [2] , in the following two senses.
• In guessing phase error e, Alice exploits a result of an ancilla measurement in H A ′ , in addition to syndrome s; i.e., Alice can access an extra hint by measuring H A ′ .
• Operator set M g,s for the ancilla measurement may depend on syndrome s found in the previous step; i.e., Alice has a freedom to optimize her measurement strategy M g,s adaptively after knowing s, in order to better determine e.
C. Reducing the security to the performance of quantum phase error correction
Next we illustrate that the security of the virtual PA scheme (and thus also of the actual scheme) can be reduced to the performance of the phase error correction Π pec embedded inside Π vp . From the structure of the virtual scheme, it is evident that the result of Π pec , i.e. ρ pec-vp , takes the form
That is, ρ pec-vp,g is the case of fixed g, and ρ pec-vp the average with respect to randomly chosen g. Below we discuss these two cases in detail.
Case of fixed g
Whenever we discuss phase error correction in this paper, we regard | 0 as the correct phase that should be recovered, and all other phases as errors. Accordingly, we evaluate the performance of Π pec,g by the phase error probability in
with ρ pec-vp,g A being the reduced state for H A corresponding to ρ pec-vp,g ; i.e., ρ
AA ′ E ). We will also call this probability the failure probability of Π pec,g . It has been known that P ph A (ρ pec-vp,g ) can be used to give an upper bound on d 1 (ρ fin-vp,g KE ), i.e., the security measure of hash value k obtained in the subsequent bit basis measurement, against Eve (see, e.g., ref. [20] ). For example, consider a simple situation where the phase error probability of the initial |Ψ ini-ap is sufficiently low, and Π pec,g always succeeds: P . Hence a perfect error correction Π pec,g , achieving P ph A (ρ pec-vp,g ) = 0, implies the perfect security d 1 (ρ fin-vp,g KE ) = 0. This observation has been extended to the general case including P ph > 0 as
Although inequality (23) is a well-known result (see, e.g., ref.
[20]), we reproduce the proof in appendix C for readers' convenience. Note that, due to the virtuality of the virtual PA scheme (lemma 2), inequality (23) also implies a bound for the actual scheme
Case of randomly chosen g
When hash function g is chosen randomly, we have to
given in eqs. (8) and (9) . By combining relations (9) and (24) and by applying Jensen's inequality (square root is a concave function), we can bound
This means that, in order to bound the secrecy measure
, it suffices to bound the average failure probability g Pr(
) of the phase error correction algorithm Π pec,g , embedded inside virtual PA algorithm Π vp .
D. LHL-like bound derived from a coding theorem of phase error correction
Now, if we recall the LHL (lemma 1) and compare inequalities (14) and (25), we see that both the exponential minimum entropy 2 (14), i.e., the quantity on the right hand side of (25) can always be bounded from above by that of (14) . Interestingly, this relation can be interpreted as a coding theorem for our phase error correction Π pec,g that bounds the average failure probability of Π pec,g in terms of the minimum entropy H min (ρ 
We will prove this theorem in appendix B. To reiterate, the magnitude of the minimum entropy H min (ρ ini-ap AE |E) does not only guarantee the effectiveness of the leftover hashing lemma, but also that of phase error correction Π pec,g , embedded in Π vp . It is so effective that if one substitutes inequality (26) to (25), one can reproduce the LHL for the non-smoothed case.
Corollary 1 (Quantum LHL-like bound derived from the coding theorem). Under the setting of virtual PA scheme (Π vp , |Ψ ini-ap ), if random hash function G is universal 2 , we have from (25) and (26),
This bound is slightly looser than (14), by the factor of 2 √ 2, but we consider this difference as inessential because in practice it can easily be compensated for by shortening length m of hash value k by three bits.
The discussion above can be considered as an alternative proof of the LHL, obtained by utilizing the PECbased approach; as PA scheme Π ap can be considered as a special case of QKD where Alice alone generates a final key in the absence of Bob.
E. Generalizations
We present two types of generalization of the above results. 
The proof is essentially the same as in corollary 5.6.1. of ref. [11] , but we write it out below to demonstrate that it can be proved entirely within our argument using phase error correction. Note that in this proof the appropriate strategy M g,s for an ancilla measurement is described explicitly.
Proof. By definition of the smooth minimum entropy in eq. (12), there exists a sub-normalized stateρ
We denote the results of applying the actual PA algorithm Π ap,g to ρ
In this setting, by using the triangle inequality of the trace distance, d 1 (ρ fin-ap,g KE ) can be bounded as
The first and the third terms on the right hand side of (29) can each be bounded by ε:
By definition of the ideal states, we have ρ
Since Π ap,g is a CPTP map, the quantities on the right hand side can be further bounded as ρ
Next we bound d 1 ρ fin-ap,g KE on the right hand side of (29). Choose an arbitrary purification ofρ ini-ap AE and denote it by |Ψ ini-ap . Then from lemma 2, it fol-
. Also choose the ancilla measurement M g,s in the virtual PA algorithm Π vp,g , such that inequality (26) of theorem 1 holds for |Ψ ini-ap andρ ini-ap . Then corollary 1 can be applied, and the aver-
with respect to the random choice of g can be bounded as
Then by using eq. (9), we obtain the lemma.
Semi-purification and twirling
Thus far we always assumed that the initial state of the virtual PA is a purification |Ψ ini-ap of the initial cq state ρ ini-ap AE . However, as we will see in our discussion on QKD in the next section, it is useful to consider a larger class of inputs that we call semi-purifications: That is,
It is obvious from this definition that purifications are a special case of semi-purifications. We note that this larger class of states can always be converted to a purification by the following simple operation, which we call twirling. 
Definition 3 (Twirling
We omit the proof since it is quite straightforward. By inserting this operation at the beginning of virtual PA Π vp , we can construct the following scheme.
Virtual PA scheme with twirling (Π vpt , |Φ ini-ap )
Initial state:
Apply Π tw A|A ′′ , described in definition 3.
-We denote the result by |Ψ tw-vpt
-We denote the result by ρ
The following properties are obvious from the construction:
and thus the scheme above,
Hence the situation in step 2 of (Π vpt , |Φ ini-ap ) is equivalent to that of the virtual scheme (Π vp , |Ψ ini-ap ) of section III B. This means that all the results obtained in this section hold also for (Π vpt , |Φ ini-ap ), including theorem 1 and corollaries 1 and 2.
IV. APPLICATION TO THE SECURITY PROOF OF QKD
Next we apply our results on privacy amplification (PA), obtained in the previous section, to quantum key distribution (QKD).
As mentioned in section I, there are two major approaches to the security proof of QKD, which are generally considered independent of each other: (i) The PECbased approach, or the Mayers-Shor-Preskill approach [6, 7] : This is essentially the same as our argument using the virtual PA scheme, given in the previous section. One constructs a virtual QKD protocol which has a phase error correction (PEC) algorithm embedded inside. The security analysis of the final key is then reduced to bounding the failure probability of the PEC. (ii) The LHL-based approach, or Renner's approach [11] , which uses the leftover hashing lemma (LHL), lemma 1 of this paper.
In the previous section, we considered PA scheme Π ap , which can be thought of as a special case of QKD where Alice alone generates a final key in the absence of Bob. For this special case, we have shown that there is a direct connection between the two approaches of the security proof; i.e., we proved essentially the same results as the LHL only by using the PEC-based approach. Below we show that such connection also exists for QKD. That is, for QKD protocols in general, we present an explicit procedure for converting a security proof of one approach to that of another approach. We also show that the obtained security bounds are the same, except for the presence of an inessential constant factor. This result shows that these two approaches are essentially the same.
The idea is to simply apply our result of the previous section on PA to QKD. We replace an actual PA algorithm embedded inside a QKD protocol with the virtual PA defined in the previous section, and as a result, obtain a virtual QKD protocol with a virtual PEC embedded inside.
However, there are apparent obstacles in carrying out this idea: (a) The security criteria of PA and QKD are different; i.e., in addition to the secrecy required by PA, QKD also requires the correctness (see section IV B 1). (b) In our argument of the virtual PA scheme, we always assumed that the initial state is a purification or a semipurification of cq state ρ AE , with H ε min (ρ AE |E) being bounded from below, but this assumption of semi-purity may not be true for QKD. For example, each player may generate mixed at any stage of the protocol.
Below we demonstrate that we can indeed overcome these obstacles and complete the conversions between the two approaches, by writing down every step of the conversion explicitly.
A. General QKD scheme
Definition
As in the previous sections, we call a set consisting of an initial state ρ ini and a QKD protocol Π a QKD scheme (Π, ρ ini ). In discussions below, we restrict ourselves to actual QKD schemes having the structure (Π aq , ρ ini-aq ) specified below. To the best of our knowledge, all practical QKD schemes known at the present (e.g., [1, 13, 21, 22] ) can be described as a specific case of this scheme (for detailed argument on the generality of this scheme, see section IV A 3).
1. Sample measurement:
Alice and Bob measure H A ′ and H B ′ respectively. They then discuss their measurement results over a public channel and decide if they abort or continue the protocol.
Sifted key measurement:
Alice (respectively, Bob) again measures H A ′ (respectively, H B ′ ) to obtain sifted key a (b), stores it in H A (H B ) in the Z-basis.
-Hence the result is classical in H A and H B . We denote this state by ρ sif-aq
3. Key Distillation:
(a) Information Reconciliation:
i. Error correction: Alice and Bob communicate using encryption. Bob then corrects bit errors in b and obtain the corrected key b cor . ii. Verification:
Alice chooses a universal 2 function u : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} l and announces the choice publicly by writing it in H E . Alice calculates u(a), encrypts it, and sends it to Bob. Bob then decrypts it and checks if u(a) = u(b cor ); if not, they return to step i above.
For details on the encryption used here, see section IV A 2.
(b) Privacy amplification:
Alice chooses a universal 2 hash function g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m and announces the choice publicly by writing it in H G . Alice (respectively, Bob) calculates final key k = g(a) (respectively, k ′ = g(b cor )) and stores it in H K (H K ′ ).
-We denote the final state by ρ fin-aq (=ρ fin-aq
The purpose of each step is as follows. The sample measurement step selects out states that have a certain desirable property, i.e., the types of properties which ensure the final keys extracted later by PA are secure. In the actual scheme, they do this selection by continuing the protocol only when a subsystem (i.e., samples) of the initial state passes a predetermined test. The error correction step aims to correct bit errors in Bob's sifted key due to noise in the channel. Then the verification step verifies that the key is indeed corrected.
Assumptions
We continue to impose the assumptions of section II A 3 for PA schemes, and also add the following assumptions.
As to Hilbert spaces, H A ′ K is under Alice's control, and H BB ′ K ′ is under Bob's; H A , H B are n-qubit spaces, and H K , H K ′ are m-qubit. As to encryptions in step 3.(a), Alice and Bob use the one-time pad with preshared secret keys, e.g., final keys obtained in previous QKD sessions as secret keys.
There are also assumptions on the sample measurement of step 2, but we do not specify them yet; instead we specify them in sections IV D and IV E, where we discuss the security proofs. This is because these assumptions depend strongly on the approaches taken in the security proofs (i.e., the LHL-based and the PEC-based approaches), and thus it is appropriate to specify them at the moment of each proof.
Remarks on the generality of our actual scheme
We note that any practical QKD protocol known at the present (e.g., [1, 13, 21, 22] ) can be rewritten in the above form without affecting the results of a security proof (i.e., without affecting the security measure D 1 (ρ fin KK ′ EG ) defined in eq. (37)) by the following procedures.
•
A ′ E ). In such case we rewrite the initial state ρ ini-ap
A ′ EB ′ , and then let Alice measure r projectively in step 2. We also redefine space H A ′ R to be H A ′ , to simplify notation.
-Similarly, if Alice performs different measurements depending on r, i.e., if she uses different POVMs M r = { m r,i | i } with probability Pr(R = r), we replace the initial state with ρ RAA ′ EB ′ = r Pr(R = r) |r r| R ⊗ ρ AA ′ EB ′ , and let her use POVM M = { |r r| R ⊗ m r,i | r, i }. We also redefine space H A ′ R to be H A ′ .
• If Alice or Bob publicly announces pieces of information during the protocol in step 1, we assume that they do so by writing them in Eve's space H E .
B. Definition of the security
Standard security criterion of QKD (ε-security)
In this subsection, we often abbreviate ρ ini-aq , ρ fin-aq as ρ ini , ρ fin . The goal of the security analysis of QKD is to guarantee that, except with a negligible probability, (i) Alice's and Bob's final keys k, k ′ in H KK ′ are uniformly distributed over {0, 1} m , and (ii) k, k ′ are not accessible by Eve through H EG . Hence in defining the security criteria, we may focus on ρ fin-aq KK ′ EG , the reduced state for H KK ′ EG corresponding to ρ fin-aq in , i.e., ρ fin-aq
As to the quantitative definition of "except with a negligible probability", it is customary to use an approach similar to that used in section II B for the case of PA. 
Corresponding to this state, the ideal state is defined to be
Note that ρ ideal KK ′ EG indeed embodies the two conditions for the ideal situation, mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Then we measure the security of QKD protocols by the trace distance · · · 1 between these two states; i.e., we use the definition of • ε-security: A QKD protocol is said to be ε-secure,
As in the case of PA, this security criteria is known to satisfy the universal composability [23] , and for this reason, it is considered the standard.
Separation of the secrecy and the correctness
Hence the goal of a security proof of QKD is to prove D 1 (ρ fin KK ′ EG ) ≤ ε. Next we show that this task can further be reduced to proving the secrecy of Alice's final key k alone (corollary 3). The key observation is that D 1 (ρ fin KK ′ EG ) ≤ ε can be divided into a set of simpler conditions. Consider the following two conditions [11] :
• ε ′ -secrecy of Alice's final key alone (disregarding Bob's) against Eve: That is,
is the trace distance defined in section II B, and ρ fin KEG is the reduced state for H KEG corresponding to ρ fin .
• ε ′′ -correctness: Alice's and Bob's final keys k, k ′ agree except for probability ε ′′ ; i.e., Pr K = K ′ ∧ ρ fin ≤ ε ′′ , where
with ρ fin KK ′ being the reduced state for H KK ′ corresponding to ρ fin .
Then D 1 (ρ fin KK ′ EG ) can be bounded as follows. Lemma 5 (Separation of the secrecy and the correctness).
E.g., the ε ′ -secrecy and the ε ′′ -correctness imply the ε-security with ε = ε ′ + 2ε ′′ . The proof of this lemma is quite straightforward (see appendix D of this paper, or section 6.1 of ref. [11] ). Furthermore, if we recall that the verification function u of step 3.(a).ii is universal 2 , the ε ′′ -correctness can be guaranteed automatically. That is, by using eq. (13), the definition of the universal 2 property, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 6 (Bound on the correctness by using universal 2 function).
By combining these two lemmas, we finally obtain Corollary 3 (Security bounded by the secrecy).
C. Conversion to virtual QKD schemes
Hence the security proof of QKD is now reduced to 
by using the LHL. On the other hand, the third scheme has virtual PEC embedded inside. In section IV D 2, we will see that it allows us to prove the security using the PEC.
Omission of Bob's operations
Suppose that Bob gives up all his operations after step 2 in Π aq , then the actual scheme (Π aq , ρ ini-aq ) becomes (Π vq1 , ρ ini-aq ) given below.
-This is the same as in the actual scheme.
Protocol Π vq1 :
1. Sample measurement: Same as step 1 of Π aq .
Sifted key measurement:
Alice measures H A ′ to obtain sifted key a, and stores it in H A in the Z-basis.
-We denote the result by ρ sif-vq1 .
Privacy amplification by Alice alone:
Alice chooses a universal 2 hash function g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m and announces the choice publicly by writing it in H G . Then she calculates k = g(a) and stores it in H K .
-We denote the result by ρ fin-vq1 .
States ρ sif-vq1 and ρ fin-vq1 , appearing in this scheme, has the following properties:
and thus (Π vq1 , ρ ini-aq ) is indeed virtual.
Proof. In (Π vq1 , ρ ini-aq ), the initial state ρ
ini-aq
A ′ EB ′ and Alice's operations in H AKG are identical to those in the actual scheme (Π aq , ρ ini-aq ). Hence at any stage of the protocol, the reduced states for H AE or for H KEG are also identical to those in (Π aq , ρ ini-aq ). Thus we obtain inequalities (42) and (43).
Purification of the overall state
We modify (Π vq1 , ρ ini-aq ) above further such that the overall state before step 3, Alice's PA, becomes pure. The basic idea is to purify the initial state ρ ini-aq by introducing new ancilla spaces, and then to rewrite all measurements as a unitary operation followed by a projective measurement; for the details about these techniques, see, e.g., section 2.2.8 of ref. [2] . More precisely, we make the following changes to (Π vq1 , ρ ini-aq ).
1. Let Alice execute all of Bob's operations on his behalf, in addition to her own operations. 3. Z basis measurement: Alice measures H A in the Z-basis to obtain sifted key a.
-We denote the result by ρ sif-vq2 .
Privacy amplification by Alice alone:
Same as step 3 of Π vq1 .
-We denote the result by ρ fin-vq2 .
This scheme has the following properties. , described in section III B 4; that is, (a) Phase error correction using P C g assisted by ancilla measurements in HĀ T (Π pec,g A|ĀT ).
-We denote the result by |Ψ pec-vq3 .
(b) Bit basis measurement: Measure eigenvalues (−1) k1 , . . . , (−1) km of operatorsZ 1 , · · · ,Z m in H A , and store hash value k = (k 1 , . . . , k m ) ∈ {0, 1} m in H K .
-We denote the result by ρ fin-vq3 .
We note that steps 1 and 2 of Π vq3 above are identical to those of Π vq2 ; we wrote them out explicitly for the sake of completeness, since this scheme will be referred to frequently in later subsections. This scheme has the following properties. 
D. Converting the LHL-based proofs to the PEC-based proofs
By making use of the virtual schemes obtained above, we next show that there are direct connections between proofs of the LHL-based approach and of the the PECbased approach. First we show that the LHL-based proofs can always be converted to those of the PEC-based approach.
Brief review of the LHL-based security proof
We begin by reviewing the LHL-based security proof of QKD briefly [11] .
a. LHL-type QKD scheme As mentioned in section IV A 1, the sample measurement step of the actual protocol Π aq is designed to select out states having a certain desirable property. When one uses the LHL-based approach for the security proof, it is customary to define the desirable property as follows, such that the LHL (lemma 1) can readily be applied to bound d 1 (ρ fin-aq KEG ). 
Hence we call QKD schemes with this assumption the LHL-type QKD schemes.
b. LHL-based security proof of the LHL-type schemes For these schemes, the LHL-based proof usually proceeds as follows.
(i) The situation of step 3 in (Π vq1 , ρ ini-aq ) is equivalent to that of the actual PA, defined in section II. Thus one can bound d 1 (ρ fin-vq1 KEG ) by using the LHL (lemma 1) as
(ii) From the virtuality of scheme (Π vq1 , ρ ini-aq ), i.e., from lemma 7, we have
Thus inequality (48) can be rewritten as
(iii) Combining inequalities (41), (47) and (51), we obtain
which completes the security proof.
Conversion to the PEC-based security proofs
Next we show that this type of security proofs can always be converted to those of the PEC-based approach. That is, for an arbitrary scheme of the LHL-type, with assumption SM-LHL, one can always construct a proof that relies solely on the properties of the PEC, and not on the LHL.
a. PEC-based proof of the LHL-type schemes
The proof proceeds by similar steps as in section IV D 1, only the argument leading to the bound on d 1 (ρ fin-aq KEG ) is quite different. Namely, (a) We use the third virtual scheme (Π vq3 , ρ ini-vq3 ), not the first, and reduce the security proof to bounding d 1 (ρ fin-vq3 KEG ). (b) In order to bound this quantity, we make use of corollary 2, not of the LHL. The actual proof proceeds as follows.
(i) The situation in steps 4 and 5 of (Π vq3 , ρ ini-vq3 ) is identical to that of the virtual PA scheme (Π vp , |Ψ ini-ap ) of section III B 4, with the input being |Ψ ini-ap = |Ψ tw-vq3 , a purification of ρ sif-aq AE (see lemma 9). Hence we can apply corollary 2 and obtain
(ii) From the virtuality of scheme (Π vq3 , ρ ini-vq3 ), i.e., from lemma 9, we have
and thus inequality (53) can be rewritten as
(iii) Combining inequalities (41), (47) and (55), we obtain
We again stress that the essential part of this proof, inequality (53), is obtained solely from the properties of the PEC algorithm Π pec , embedded in the virtual scheme (Π vq3 , ρ ini-vq3 ). In this sense, we say that this is a proof by the PEC-based approach. In section IV E 1, we also give a direct comparison between this and the conventional forms of the PEC-based proofs.
Inequality (56) is slightly weaker than the counterpart (52) obtained in the LHL-approach by a constant factor of 3/2 appearing in an exponent of the r.h.s. (cf. corollary 2 for the case of PA). We regard this factor as inessential because it can easily be compensated for in practice, e.g., by setting length m of final key k to be 3 bits shorter.
E. Converting the PEC-based proofs to the LHL-based proof
Next we present the conversion of the reverse direction. That is, we show that any security proofs of the PECbased approach can be converted to those of the LHLbased approach.
Brief review of the PEC-based security proof
We again begin by reviewing the existing method (see, e.g., [8] [9] [10] 20] ).
a. PEC-type QKD schemes Again, as in the case of the LHL-approach, the sample measurement step of the actual protocol Π aq is supposed to select out states having a certain desirable property. However, when using the PEC-based approach [8] [9] [10] 20] , it is customary to define the desirable property with respect to the pure state |Ψ pre-vq3 appearing in the third virtual scheme. Note that this is in strong contrast to the case of the LHLbased approach, where the property was defined with respect to ρ sif in the actual scheme. In addition, it is also customary to define the desirable property of |Ψ pre-vq3 in terms of its phase probability distribution p X , defined below.
Definition 5. The distribution of phase degrees of freedom X pre-vq3 of |Ψ pre-vq3 is defined by
where ρ pre-vq3 A is the reduced state for H A corresponding to |Ψ pre-vq3 .
In this setting, one assumes that the randomness of X pre-vq3 is sufficiently small, such that the PEC Π pec inside the virtual protocol Π vq3 almost always succeeds.
Assumption SM-PEC (Typical assumptions on the sample measurement in the PEC-based approach):
The randomness of X pre-vq3 is sufficiently small; e.g.,
The error probability Pr(X pre-vq3 = 0) is bounded from above.
• Example 2: The Shannon entropy H(X pre-vq3 ) is bounded from above.
We will call QKD schemes with these types of assumptions the PEC-type QKD schemes.
b. PEC-based proof of the PEC-type schemes The basic idea is the same as in the proof of the LHL-type schemes given in section IV D 2. The only difference is that, in order to bound the failure probability P ph A of the PEC, we may use any types of a coding theorems of the PEC, besides theorem 1. The actual proof proceeds as follows.
(i) By using a certain coding theorem for the PEC (e.g., theorem 1, but not necessarily restricted to it), one bounds the average failure probability of the PEC Π pec,g , embedded inside the third virtual scheme (Π vq3 , ρ ini-vq3 ) as
where function P ph (· · · ) is defined in (22) , and P th is a constant determined by assumption SM-PEC. Then by substituting (58) in inequality (25), one obtains the bound
(ii) From the virtuality of the third virtual scheme (lemma 9), we have d 1 (ρ fin-vq3
. Thus inequality (59) can be rewritten as
(iii) Combining inequalities (41) and (60), we obtain
Note that the PEC-based proof for the LHL-type schemes, given in section IV D 2, was indeed a special case of this argument: There, the randomness of X pre-vq3 was measured using the minimum entropy H ε ′′′ min (ρ sif-aq AE |E), and theorem 1 was used as an example of inequality (58).
Special case using Rényi entropy of degree one half
The description of the PEC-type schemes above becomes drastically simple by using the following quantity as the measure of the randomness of X pre-vq3 :
Definition 6. The Rényi entropy of degree 1/2 of a probability distribution Pr(X = x) is defined by
More precisely, suppose one uses the particular form of assumption SM-PEC, which takes the from Assumption SM-PEC-Rényi (An example of assumption SM-PEC using the Rényi entropy): 
Lemma 10. Assumption SM-PEC-Rényi implies
The proof is a direct consequence of the duality relation between the minimum and the maximum entropies [18] ; see appendix E.
Thus the situation is now reduced to that of the LHLtype schemes of section IV D, and the security can be proved by the LHL-based approach and also by the PECbased approach. The proof of the PEC-based approach can be given by repeating the discussion of section IV D 2 or IV E 1, and the result is the security bound
If one wishes to convert this proof to the LHL-based proof, one can use the discussion of section IV D 1 and obtain
V. CONCLUSION
We have shown the equivalence between the two major approaches to the security proof of quantum key distribution (QKD), which had generally been regarded as independent of each other; namely, the phase error correction (PEC)-based approach and the leftover hashing lemma (LHL)-based approach. These are also referred to as the Shor-Preskill-Mayers approach and as Renner's approach.
In order to show the equivalence, we gave an explicit procedure for converting security proofs by one approach to those of another approach. The conversions are made step by step in a constructive manner so that the relation between the two approaches is kept transparent. The security bounds obtained are the same regardless of the approach, except for the presence of an inessential constant factor. for x ∈ {0, 1} d ; note that these vectors satisfy X
We often call |z the bit basis, and | x the phase basis.
Completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) maps are denoted by Π; e.g., Π vp A|G|A ′ for the virtual PA algorithm defined in section III B 4. Subscripts of Π indicate systems on which it operate. When we wish to indicate clearly that different systems have a different role (such as the input and the output registers, and ancillas), we insert symbol '|' between them.
We denote by operator Π Z-mea an operation of erasing non-diagonal elements in the Z basis, Π
and call it the measurement in the Z-basis, with a slight abuse of terminology. Similarly, we also define the X-basis measurement by Π
Whenever we discuss phase error correction, we choose | 0 to be the correct phase, and consider all other phases as errors; hence the phase error rate of a state ρ D is given by
In a composite space of two d-qubit spaces H A ⊗ H B , we define a CNOT operation N A|B by
A state ρ is normalized if Trρ = 1, and sub-normalized if Trρ ≤ 1. A state ρ AB in H A ⊗ H B is a classicalquantum (cq) state, if its H A part is diagonalized with a basis { |v i }:
The trace norm of a matrix M is defined by
For sub-normalized states ρ, τ , the generalized quantum fidelity F and the purified distance P are defined to be
(see, e.g., [18] ). F equals the usual fidelity, as defined in [2] , when at least one of states ρ, τ is normalized. P is an upper bound on the trace distance: ρ − τ 1 ≤ P (ρ, τ ). Sub-normalized states ρ, τ are called ε-close, and denoted ρ ≈ ε τ , when P (ρ, τ ) ≤ ε. 
where ρ ideal KE is defined in (6) . 
Below we give the proofs of these lemmas.
Proof of lemma 11
In this proof, we abbreviate ρ ini-ap , |Ψ a
. Reduction to a special case
First we show that it suffices to prove this lemma only for the special case where g is chosen such that hash value k equals the most significant m bits of sifted key a, and the syndrome measurement are phase value of the least significant n − m qubits. 
Proof. Recall that {g 1 , · · · , g m } and {h 1 , · · · , h n−m }, given in section III B 3, are orthogonal to each other, and choose vectors g m+1 , . . . , g n satisfying g i+m · h j = δ ij for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n − m. Consider a permutation over nbit strings defined by a linear transform a ′ = av with v := (g T 1 , . . . , g T n ), and let V be the corresponding unitary transform in the n-qubit space
Then relations (B3), (B4) follow from a straightforward calculation.
We transform our virtual PA by applying this V to H A in a straightforward manner: We transform the initial state as Ψ ini′ = V A Ψ ini , which is also a purification of a cq state with respect to the bit basis. We also replace all the operators
A , and call it the transformed virtual PA algorithm Π vp′,g . We also define the transformed phase error correction Π pec′,g similarly. We denote the out- ) follows by recalling the definition of the failure probability (22) and by noting ρ
Thus it suffices to prove lemma 11 for the transformed case of Π vp′,g and Ψ ini′ , and from now on we restrict ourselves to this case. Note that in this case, measurements in H A are greatly simplified due to (B3), (B4). Syndrome measurements of step 1(a) are phase basis measurement using the normal Pauli operators X i of qubits i = m + 1, . . . , n, and hash value measurements of step 2 are bit basis measurements using Z i of qubits i = 1, . . . , m. Thus it is convenient to rewrite bit string a ∈ {0, 1} n as a concatenation a = a K a S of a K ∈ {0, 1} m and a S ∈ {0, 1} n−m , and according to that, divide H A as H A = H K ⊗ H S , with
Then hash value equals a K , and the syndrome measurement becomes the X-basis measurement in H S . 
where |ψ a EA1 are arbitrarily chosen purifications of Eve's state ρ ini,a E included in the initial state (1), i.e., Tr A1 |ψ a ψ a | = ρ a E , and H A1 is an ancilla space introduced for this purpose. System H A2 is a replica of the n-qubit system H A , which we introduce in order to make ρ AE = Tr A ′ (|Ψ ini Ψ ini |) a cq state. In the second line of (B7), we divided H A2 further into H A2 = H K ′ ⊗ H S ′ , in the same way as in (B6), as
We note that, in summary, H A and H A ′ are divided as
For later convenience, we also define a purification of the ideal state ρ ideal AE to be
where |ϕ EA1 is a purification of ρ E defined in (7). Thus it satisfies Tr A1 |ϕ ϕ| = ρ E = Tr A ρ ini AE .
c. Unitary operation for phase error correction
By applying CNOT gate Π cnot S ′ |S , defined in (A2), to these states, we obtain
which are purifications of |0 0| S ⊗ ρ fin-vp,g KE and |0 0| S ⊗ ρ ideal KE respectively. Hence due to Uhlmann's theorem, we can define a unitary operation T A ′ satisfying
(see, e.g., exercise 2.81 and theorem 9.4 of ref. [2] ). We also note that
(B15) is a pure state with zero phase error. Thus if we define a unitary operation W AA ′ for phase error correction
its failure probability can be bounded from above as To this end, we define an operator set w to be 
where E s,e
Thus the quantum operation w = { W s,e AA ′ | s, e } is indeed of the form of Π pec,g . This operation attains the same failure probability as unitary phase error correction W , since
where we used | e e| A2 2 = | e e| A2 , e | e e| A2 = I A2 . This completes the proof of lemma 11.
Proof of lemma 12
In this proof, we abbreviate ρ ini-ap and ρ fin-vp,g (=ρ fin-ap,g ), as ρ ini and ρ fin,g , respectively.
Here, function 1[· · · ] takes value one if the condition inside brackets holds, and zero otherwise. Due to eq. (7), the reduced states for system H E corresponding to ρ fin,g and to ρ ini are the same, and we denoted it here as ρ E . The second inequality of (B27) holds because the quantity Tr {· · · } is non-negative, and g is a universal 2 hash function, satisfying inequality (13) . It should be noted that, in fact, the second and further lines of inequality (B27) are essentially a special case of lemma 5.4.3, ref. [11] , with σ E = ρ E .
Next by setting α = ∞ in eq. (48), corollary 4, ref. [24] (also see the paragraph of eq. (52) of the same paper), we obtain
Finally by combining inequalities (B27) and (B28), we obtain (B2).
Appendix C: Proof of Inequality (23) Again by using the same argument as in appendix B 1 a, we may assume that system H A is divided as H A = H K ⊗ H S , as in (B6). In this case, the step 2.(b) of the virtual PA scheme is the usual Z-basis measurement in H K . In addition, it is straightforward to see that phase error probability in H K is bounded by that in H A ,
Thus it suffices to prove the following lemma. 
where Π
Z-mea K
is the Z-basis measurement in H K ; Π Z-mea K (ρ KE ) = z |z z| K ρ KE |z z| K (cf. appendix A).
Proof. Choose an arbitrary purification |Ψ ′ KEB of ρ KE , with H B being an ancilla space. Also define another mqubit ancilla space H C , and let | 0 C be one of the X-basis states there. Then
is also a purification of ρ KE . This state can be expanded with respect to the Z-basis of H K as
With this setting, it is straightforward to verify that |ψ k EB and Π Z-mea K (ρ KE ) are related as
The ideal state corresponding to Π Z-mea K (ρ KE ) takes the form
and we can choose a semi-purification of Π 
On the fourth line we used the monotonicity of trace distance with respect to CPTP maps, Π
and Tr BC . The fourth line follows by definitions of the trace distance and of the fidelity; see, e.g., section 9.2.3, ref. [2] . The sixth line follows from Ψ|Ψ ideal ≤ 1.
Next note that |Ψ and |Ψ ideal can be rewritten as
| ψ 
and thus P ph K (ρ KE ) takes the form
By combining (C10) and (C14), we obtain (C2).
Appendix D: Proof of lemma 5
In this proof, we often abbreviate ρ The two terms on the right hand side of (D1) can each be bounded as
and
Combining Inequalities (D1), (D4), and (D5), we obtain inequality (39).
Simlarly, let ρ pre-vq3,X-mea AĀE be the result of applying the X-basis measurement in system H A on |Ψ 
Also by using the data processing inequality of the maximum entropy [18] , H max (ρ pre-vq3,X-mea AĀ |Ā) can be bounded as ). More precisely, inequality (E6) follows from Result 4, section 5.1.1, ref. [18] , which is a special case of theorem 5.7 of the same literature, with H B ′ , H C and H C ′ being one-dimensional spaces, and maps E and F being the identity, and G being tracing out of H B .
Further, due to (57), ρ Thus by using the results of the section 4.3.2, ref. [18] , it follows that
Finally combining (63), (E3), (E5), (E6), and (E8), we obtain the lemma.
